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Abstract: This	  paper	  refers	  to	  the	  ranking	  of	  densities	  that	  describe	  the	  distribution	  of	  an	  attribute	   in	   a	   given	   set	   of	   populations.	   The	   key	   elements	   of	   the	   problem	   are:	   (i)	   The	  distributions	   refer	   to	   ordered	   categorical	   data	   (e.g.	   health	   statuses,	   educational	  achievements,	   prestige	   positions,	   satisfaction	   levels);	   (ii)	   The	   evaluation	   of	   each	  distribution	  is	  relative	  to	  the	  others	  with	  which	  it	  is	  compared.	  We	  propose	  an	  evaluation	  method	  that	  is	  cardinal,	  complete	  and	  transitive,	  which	  based	  on	  the	  consistent	  application	  of	   the	   "willingness	   to	   pay"	   principle	   and	   the	   likelihood	   of	   getting	   better	   results	   when	  making	   a	   random	   extraction.	   A	   characterization	   of	   this	   method,	   in	   terms	   of	   simple	  properties,	  is	  provided.	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1	  	  	  Introduction	  	  Ranking	   distributions	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   basic	   problems	   when	   comparing	  populations	   with	   respect	   to	   some	   attribute.	   We	   analyse	   here	   the	   case	   of	   distributions	  regarding	   variables	   that	   measure	   attributes	   with	   the	   property	   that	   higher	   values	   are	  preferable.	   We	   can	   think	   of	   variables	   related	   to	   aspects	   such	   as	   health,	   wellbeing,	  satisfaction,	  success,	  effectiveness,	  durability,	  precision,	  endurance,	  etc.	  We	  call	  this	  type	  of	  variables	  monotone.	  We	   propose	   a	   complete,	   transitive	   and	   cardinal	   measure	   that	   permits	   one	   to	  evaluate	  the	  relative	  desirability	  of	  those	  distributions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  getting	  better	  results.	  This	  measure	  is	  based	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  a	  standard	  criterion	  used	  in	  economics	  to	  evaluate	  those	  commodities	  for	  which	  there	  is	  not	  a	   well	   defined	  market	   price	   (either	   because	   they	   are	   singular	   or	   because	   there	   is	   not	   a	  regular	  market	  for	  them).	  	  	  
2	  	  	  Motivation	  and	  informal	  description	  	  	   Let	  us	  motivate	  the	  approach	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  very	  simple	  example.	  Suppose	  we	  have	  a	  collection	  of	  urns,	   containing	  prizes	  of	  different	   categories,	   and	   that	  we	  have	   to	  make	  an	  extraction	  of	  one	  of	  those	  urns.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  prizes	  within	  each	  urn	  is	  known,	  which	  urn	  to	  choose?	  To	  make	  it	  more	  precise,	  take	  the	  simplest	  case	  in	  which	  we	  have	  just	  two	  urns.	  The	  distribution	  of	  prizes	  by	  categories	  within	  each	  urn	  is	  described	  in	  Table	  1,	  where	  categories	  are	  ordered	  from	  best	  (category	  I)	  to	  worst	  (category	  IV):	  	   Table	  1	  	  Prize	  Category	   I	   II	   III	   IV	  Shares	  urn	  A	   0.2	   0.4	   0.3	   0.1	  Shares	  urn	  B	   0.3	   0.3	   0.2	   0.2	  	   We	  can	  consider	  here	  two	  different	  questions.	  First,	  which	  urn	  is	  best?	  Second,	  how	  much	  better	   is	  one	  urn	  than	  the	  other?	  The	  first	  question	  involves	  an	  ordinal	  assessment	  (ranking	  the	  urns)	  whereas	  the	  second	  calls	  for	  a	  cardinal	  evaluation.	  The	  ordinal	  nature	  of	  the	  information	  makes	  those	  questions	  more	  challenging.	  We	  propose	  to	  address	  those	  problems	  as	  follows.	  Let	   pAB 	  stand	  for	  the	  probability	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that	  a	  random	  extraction	  from	  A	  yields	  a	  prize	  of	  a	  higher	  category	  than	  another	  random	  extraction	  from	  B;	  call	  this	  number	  the	  domination	  probability	  of	  A	  over	  B.	  And	  let	   pBA 	  be	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  opposite	  (that	  an	  extraction	  from	  B	  yields	  a	  prize	  of	  a	  higher	  category	  than	  one	  from	  A).	  Then,	  if	   pAB 	  is	  larger	  than	   pBA 	  we	  declare	  that	  urn	  A	  is	  better	  than	  urn	  B.	  This	   is	   a	   simple	   principle,	   with	   a	   clear	   meaning,	   which	   allows	   comparing	   any	   pair	   of	  alternatives	   and	   does	   not	   require	   information	   about	   the	   precise	   value	   of	   the	   prizes.	   The	  ratio	   of	   the	   two	   domination	   probabilities	   (or,	   alternatively,	   its	   difference)	   contains	   also	  information	  on	  how	  much	  better	  is	  one	  than	  the	  other.	  In	  the	  example	  given	  in	  Table	  1	  the	  domination	  probabilities	  are	  given	  by:	   pAB = 0.36 ,	   pBA = 0.38 .	  Therefore,	  urn	  B	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  preferable	  to	  urn	  A.	  Moreover,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  A	  is	  slightly	  better	  than	  B	  (a	  5.5%	  better,	  to	  be	  precise).	  Is	  that	  the	  answer	  we	  were	  looking	  for	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  two	  questions	  above?	  Not	  yet.	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  way	  of	  comparing	  the	  desirability	  of	  the	  distributions	  is	  not	  fully	  satisfactory	   is	  because	   it	   is	  a	  non-­‐transitive	  criterion.	  That	   is,	  dealing	  with	   three	  or	  more	  urns	  may	   yield	   a	   cycle	   and	   thus	   the	   impossibility	   of	   ranking	   them,	   even	   though	  we	  may	  know	  the	  relative	  evaluation	  of	  any	  pair	  of	  urns.	  The	  following	  example	  shows	  the	  problem.	  Consider	  now	  the	  case	  of	  three	  urns,	  C,	  D,	  E,	  whose	  prize	  distributions	  are	  described	  in	  Table	  2.	   Table	  2	  	  Prize	  Category	   I	   II	   III	   IV	  Shares	  urn	  C	   0.5	   0	   0	   0.5	  Shares	  urn	  D	   0	   0.7	   0.3	   0	  Shares	  urn	  E	   0	   0.3	   0.7	   0	  	   Computing	  the	  corresponding	  domination	  probabilities	  yields	  the	  following	  results:	  
pCD = pDC = 1/ 2 	  and	   pCE = pEC = 1/ 2 .	  So	  C	  is	  indifferent	  to	  D,	  and	  C	  is	  also	  indifferent	  to	  E.	  Yet	  D	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  strictly	  better	  than	  E,	  as	   pDE = 0.49 	  and	   pED = 0.09 .	  In	  order	   to	  keep	   the	  basic	   intuition	  about	   the	  key	  role	  of	  domination	  probabilities	  and	   avoid	   the	   intransitivity	   problem,	  we	   slightly	   reformulate	   the	   evaluation	   criterion	   by	  introducing	  the	  notions	  of	  opportunity	  advantage	  and	  opportunity	  cost.	  Consider	  again	  the	  case	  of	  two	  urns,	  A	  and	  B,	  and	  suppose	  that	  making	  an	  extraction	  requires	  paying	  a	  fee	   qA 	  for	  urn	  A	  and	   qB 	  for	  urn	  B.	  The	  opportunity	  advantage	  of	  choosing	  from	  urn	  A,	  rather	  than	  from	  urn	  B,	   is	   given	  by	   the	  product	   pABqB :	   the	  probability	   of	   beating	   the	   result	   of	   urn	  B	  times	  the	  cost	  involved	  in	  choosing	  from	  that	  urn,	  which	  measures	  what	  we	  save	  by	  making	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an	   extraction	   from	   A.	   The	   opportunity	   cost	   derived	   from	   making	   an	   extraction	   from	   A	  rather	  than	  from	  B	  is	  given	  by	   pBAqA :	  the	  probability	  that	  an	  extraction	  from	  urn	  B	  gives	  a	  better	  outcome	  times	  the	  fee	  paid	  to	  choose	  from	  A.	  Consequently,	  when pABqB > pBAqA 	  it	  is	  better	   to	   choose	   urn	   A	   rather	   than	   urn	   B,	   and	   vice-­‐versa.	   Notice	   than	   in	   this	   case,	   A’s	  opportunity	  advantage	  is	  exactly	  B’s	  opportunity	  cost,	  and	  vice-­‐versa.	  	  It	   is	   then	  natural	   to	  evaluate	   the	   relative	  desirability	  of	  urn	  A	   versus	  urn	  B	  as	   the	  maximum	  fee	  that	  one	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  in	  order	  to	  choose	  from	  this	  urn	  rather	  than	  from	  urn	  B.	  This	   is,	  precisely,	   the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  criterion,	  which	  associates	  to	  urn	  A	  the	  number	  that	  balances	  A's	  opportunity	  advantage	  and	  A's	  opportunity	  cost	  (and	  in	  this	  case,	   also	   B’s	   opportunity	   advantage	   and	   opportunity	   cost).	   That	   is,	   the	   evaluation	   of	   A	  relative	  to	  B	  is	  given	  by	  the	  numbers	  𝑤!,𝑤! 	  that	  solves	  the	  equation:	  𝑝!"𝑤! = 𝑝!"𝑤!.  	  Note	  that	  the	  quotient	  	  !!!! = 𝑝!"/𝑝!"	  	  measures	  the	  relative	  desirability	  of	  urn	  A	  with	  respect	  to	  urn	  B	  and	  keeps	  the	  domination	  probabilities	  as	  the	  key	  element	  in	  the	  evaluation.	  Indeed,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  domination	  probabilities	  determine	  the	  evaluation	  except	  for	  the	  choice	  of	  units.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  the	  higher	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  the	  more	  desirable	  is	  the	  urn.	  Observe	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  this	  criterion	  to	  the	  case	  of	  more	  than	  two	  urns	  is	  not	  trivial,	   because	   it	   is	   only	   natural	   requiring	   a	   consistent	   evaluation.	   That	   is,	   that	   all	  distributions	  be	  evaluated	  by	  the	  same	  principle	  simultaneously.	  Think	  of	  the	  case	  of	  three	  urns,	  as	  in	  Table	  2,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  illustration.	  To	  calculate	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  urn	  C,	  
wC ,	   one	   should	   take	   as	   the	   appropriate	   evaluations	   for	   D	   and	   E	   their	   corresponding	  willingness	  to	  pay,	  wD 	  ,	  wE .	  But	  that	  in	  turn	  requires	  knowing	  wC .	  In	  other	  words,	  applying	  consistently	  this	  principle	  to	  the	  case	  of	   three	  or	  more	  urns	  requires	   finding	  a	   fixpoint	  of	  the	  mapping	  that	  associates	  to	  each	  urn	  its	  willingness	  to	  pay.	  That	  is,	  solving	  the	  following	  system:	  	  
wC pDC + pEC( ) = wDpCD +wE pCE
wD pCD + pED( ) = wC pDC +wE pDE








	   The	  vector	  that	  solves	  this	  equation	  system	  is	  called	  the	  worth	  and	  corresponds	  to	  the	   consistent	   application	   of	   the	   willingness	   to	   pay	   principle.	   Notice	   that	   in	   previous	  system	  we	   have,	   on	   the	   right	   hand	   side	   of	   each	   equation,	   the	   opportunity	   advantage	   of	  choosing	  for	  urns	  C,	  D	  and	  E,	  respectively,	  and	  on	  the	  left	  hand	  side,	  the	  opportunity	  costs.	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Computing	   the	   worth	   for	   the	   three	   urns	   in	   Table	   2	   yields	   the	   following	   values	  (normalizing	  those	  values	  so	  that	  the	  mean	  value	  equals	  one):	  wC = 1 ,	  wD = 1.37 ,	  wE = 0.63 .	  No	  indifference	  appears	  between	  any	  pair	  of	  urns	  and	  the	  evaluation	  fits	  much	  better	  our	  intuition	   about	   the	   relative	   desirability	   of	   those	   urns	   (notice	   the	   symmetry	   of	   the	  evaluations).	  The	  reason	  why	  these	  results	  are	  different	   from	  those	  obtained	  when	  using	  the	   direct	   domination	   probabilities	   is	   that	   now	   the	   evaluation	   of	   each	   urn	   takes	   into	  account	   all	   direct	   and	   indirect	   domination	   relationships.	   In	   other	   words,	   opportunity	  advantages	  and	  costs	  take	  into	  account	  what	  we	  choose	  (either	  urn	  C,	  D,	   	  or	  E),	  and	  what	  we	  abandon	  in	  each	  case.	  	   The	   notion	   of	   domination	   probabilities,	   used	   to	   compare	   pairs	   of	   distributions	   of	  qualitative	  variables,	  appears	  in	  Lieberson	  (1976).	  The	  concept	  of	  worth	  was	  introduced	  in	  Herrero	  &	  Villar	  (2013)	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  this	  notion	  to	  the	  case	  of	  g	  populations.	  We	  show	  here	  that	   this	  concept	  corresponds	  to	   the	  consistent	  application	  of	   the	  willingness	   to	  pay	  criterion,	   which	   allows	   enhance	   the	   scope	   of	   their	   analysis	   to	   a	   more	   general	   scenario	  (Section	  3.1).	  We	  also	  provide	  here	  a	  slightly	  different	  proof	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  worth	  vector,	  which	  makes	  the	  paper	  self-­‐contained,	  and	  an	  immediate	  extension	  of	  the	  model	  to	  the	   continuous	   case.	   An	   easy	   characterization	   of	   the	   evaluation	   function	   is	   presented	   in	  Section	  3.2,	  which	  helps	  understanding	  the	  relationship	  between	  domination	  probabilities	  and	  willingness	   to	   pay.	   A	   discussion	   on	   the	   extent	   of	   this	   evaluation	   formula	   closes	   the	  paper	  in	  Section	  4.	  Related	   evaluation	   criteria	   appear	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   problems,	   such	   as	   the	   statistical	  measure	  of	  distributional	  similarities	  (Li,	  Yi	  &	  Jestes	  (2009),	  Martínez-­‐Mekler	  et	  al	  (2009),	  Gonzalez-­‐Diaz,	   Hendrichx	   &	   Lohmann	   (2013)),	   the	   ranking	   of	   income	   distributions	   in	  different	   contexts	   (Shorrocks	   (1983),	   Bellú	   &	   Liberati	   (2005),	   Bourguignon,	   Ferreira	   &	  Leite	   (2007),	   Yalonetzky	   (2012),	   Sheriff	   &	   Maguire	   (2013),	   Cuhadaroglu	   (2013)),	   the	  analysis	   of	   segregation	   (Reardon	  &	  Firebaugh	   (2002),	  Grannis	   (2002)),	   the	   evaluation	  of	  scientific	  influence	  (Pinski	  &	  Narin	  (1976),	  Laband	  &	  Piette	  (1994),	  Palacios-­‐Huerta	  &	  Volij	  (2004),	  	  Crespo,	  Li	  &	  Ruiz-­‐Castillo	  (2013)),	  the	  comparison	  of	  network	  structures	  (Rosvall	  &	  Bergstrom	  (2007)),	  or	  the	  allocation	  of	  scores	  in	  tournaments	  (Laslier	  (1997),	  Slutzki	  &	  Volij	  (2006)).	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3	  	  	  Results	  
	  
3.1	  	  	  The	  model	  	   Our	  problem	  consists	  of	  comparing	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  given	  variable	  in	  g	  different	  populations,	  G = {1,2,...,g} ,	  with	   g ≥ 2 .	  The	  variable	  may	  be	  either	  discrete	  or	  continuous	  and	  is	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  describing	  an	  attribute.	  Let	  C	  stand	  for	  the	  range	  of	  the	  variable	  under	   study.	   When	   the	   variable	   is	   discrete,	   we	   can	   think	   of	   C	   as	   a	   set	   of	   s	   ordered	  categories,	    C = {c1,c2,..., cs} ;	   when	   the	   variable	   is	   continuous	   we	   can	   think	   of	   C	   as	   an	  interval,	  	   C = [cmin, cmax ] .	  Let	  	   fi ,	   i = 1,2,..., g ,	  be	  the	  “density”	  (with	  inverted	  commas)	  function	  that	  describes	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  variable	  in	  population	  i.	  We	  shall	  refer	  to	  the	  points	  of	  C	  as	  levels	  and	  assume	   that	   they	   are	   linearly	   ordered	  with	   respect	   to	   some	  desirability	   criterion;	   that	   is	  
ci > cj 	  implies	  that	  level	   ci 	  is	  better	  than	  level	   cj .	  When	  the	  variable	  is	  discrete	  the	  density	  is	  just	  the	  vector	  of	  relative	  frequencies.	  A	  problem	   refers	   to	   the	   comparison	   of	   the	   set	   of	   “densities”,	  F,	   that	   describe	   the	  distribution	   of	   the	   variable	   of	   reference	   in	   the	   different	   populations.	   That	   is,	  
F = { f1, f2, ..., fg} .	  An	  evaluation	  function	  is	  a	  mapping	  ϕ 	  that	  associates	  to	  each	  problem	  
F	  a	  vector	  ϕ(F) 	  of	  g	  components	  (real	  numbers)	  that	  tells	  us	  about	  the	  relative	  situation	  of	  those	  populations.	  	  The	  key	  ingredient	  for	  the	  evaluation	  is	  the	  probability	   	  that	  an	  individual	  from	  population	   i	   belongs	   to	   a	   higher	   level	   than	   an	   individual	   from	   population	   j.	   	   When	   the	  variable	  is	  discrete,	  we	  can	  compute	  this	  probability	  as	  follows:	  	  
pij = ai1 aj2 + aj3 + ...+ ajs( ) + ai2 aj3 + ...+ ajs( ) + ...+ ai(s−1)ajs [1a] 	  	  where	  	   air 	  	  denotes	  the	  relative	  frequency	  of	  value	  r	  in	  population	  i.	  When	  the	  variable	  is	  continuous,	  we	  will	  have:	  	  	  
pij = t=cmin
cmax
∫ x≤t∫ fi f jdtdx [1b] 	  	   We	   shall	   assume,	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity	   in	   exposition,	   that	   for	   all	   i,	   j,	   	  𝑝!" > 0.	  	  That	  is,	  each	  population	  has	  a	  positive	  probability	  of	  domination	  over	  some	  other.	  The	   opportunity	   advantage	   for	   a	   population	   i	   in	   a	   problem	   F,	   relative	   to	   an	  
pij
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evaluation	   function	   ϕ ,	   is	   given	   by	   the	   weighted	   sum	   of	   the	   probabilities	   that	   this	  population	   dominates	   the	   others,	   where	   the	   weights	   are	   the	   evaluations	   of	   those	  populations.	  Formally:	  	  
Ai F,ϕ( ) = j≠i∑ pijϕ j (F) 	  	   The	  corresponding	  opportunity	  cost	   is	   given	  by	   the	   sum	  of	   the	  probabilities	   that	  other	  populations	  dominate	  i,	  times	  the	  evaluation	  of	  i.	  That	  is,	  	  
Ki F,ϕ( ) =ϕi (F) j≠i∑ pji 	  We	  define	  the	  worth	  as	  the	  evaluation	  function	  ω 	  that	  associates	  to	  each	  problem	  F	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  values	  of	  the	  underlying	  “densities”.	  That	   is,	   is	   the	  vector	  of	  values	  that	   equalize,	   for	   each	   distribution,	   the	   opportunity	   advantage	   and	   the	   opportunity	   cost.	  We	  call	   the	  worth	  vector	   to	   the	  evaluation	  so	  obtained.	  The	   ith	  component	  of	   the	  worth	  vector	  is	  thus	  given	  by:	  
ω i (F) = j≠i
∑ pijω j (F)
j≠i∑ pji
, i = 1,2,...,g 	  	   Note	  that,	  by	  definition,	  the	  worth	  has	  a	  degree	  of	  freedom	  regarding	  the	  choice	  of	  units.	   We	  now	  show	  that,	  for	  each	  problem	  F,	  the	  worth	  vector	  exists	  and	  it	  is	  positive.	  	  




, i = 1,2,...,g 	  
	  
	  Proof	  	  Consider	  the	  function	   ϕ : V → R g 	  ,	  with	  	   V = {x ∈R+g / i=1g∑ xi = g} 	  ,	  given	  by:	  
 
ϕi v( ) = vi −
1
g −1 vi j≠i∑ pji − j≠i∑ pijvj( ) 	  As	  	   j≠i∑ pji ≤ g −1 	  ,	  we	  have:	  
 
ϕi v( ) ≥ vi − vi +
1
g −1 j≠i∑ pijvj ≥ 0 	  Moreover,	  
 
i=1
g∑ ϕi v( ) = g − 1g −1 i=1
g∑ vi j≠i∑ pji − i=1
g∑ j≠i∑ pijvj( ) 	  Note	  that,	  by	  construction,	   i=1g∑ vi j≠i∑ pji = i=1g∑ j≠i∑ pijvj , 	  which	  means	  that	   i=1g∑ ϕi v( ) = g. 	  	  That	  is,	  function	  	  ϕ 	  	  maps	  V	  	  into	  itself.	  As	  it	  is	  a	  continuous	  function	  and	  V	  is	  a	  compact	  convex	  
 9 
set,	   Brouwer's	   Theorem	   (e.g.	   Zeidler	   (1986)),	   ensures	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   fixpoint,	  	  
 v




, i = 1,2,...,g 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Q.e.d.	  	  	   A	  simple	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  a	  solution	  to	  be	  unique	  and	  strictly	  positive	  is	  that	  
pij > 0 	  for	  all	   i, j .	  Yet	  this	  is	  much	  stronger	  than	  required.	  What	  is	  needed	  to	  ensure	  those	  additional	   properties	   is	   the	   irreducibility	   of	   the	  matrix	   of	   domination	   probabilities.	   This	  point	  is	  discussed	  in	  Herrero	  &	  Villar	  (2013).	  	  





	  	   This	  property	  conveys	  the	   idea	  that	   the	  domination	  probability	   is	   the	  key	  element	  for	   the	   evaluation	   and	   that,	   indeed,	   it	   is	   all	   we	   need	   in	   the	   simplest	   case	   in	   which	   we	  compare	  only	  two	  distributions.	  For	  a	  problem	    F ∈F g ,	  for	   g > 2 ,	  call	   F (i ) 	  the	  two-­‐population	  problem	  consisting	  of	  population	  i	  and	  the	  population	  G− i 	  	  that	  obtains	  from	  merging	  all	  other	  populations	  into	  a	  single	  one.	  Let	  	  ϕi F (i )( ), ϕ− i F (i )( ) 	  denote	  the	  evaluation	  of	  populations	  i	  and	  G− i 	  in	  problem	  
F (i ) ,	  respectively.	  The	  property	  of	  independence	  says	  the	  following:	  
ϕi (F)
ϕi (F (i ) )
= Ai (F,ϕ )Ai (F (i ),ϕ )
	  	   That	  is,	  the	  ratio	  between	  the	  value	  attached	  to	  i	  in	  the	  original	  problem	  F	  and	  that	  in	   the	   modified	   problem	   F (i ) 	   corresponds,	   precisely,	   to	   the	   ratio	   of	   its	   opportunity	  advantages	   in	   both	   scenarios.	   The	   idea	   behind	   this	   principle	   is	   that	   changing	   the	  way	   of	  conforming	  the	  populations	  should	  not	  affect	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  evaluation.	  The	  following	  result	  is	  obtained:	  	  
Theorem	  2:	  There	  is	  a	  unique	  evaluation	  function	  that	  satisfies	  binariness	  and	  independence.	  
It	  is	  the	  function	  that	  attaches	  its	  worth	  to	  each	  group.	  	  	  Proof	  	   Let	   ϕ 	   be	   an	   evaluation	   function	   that	   satisfies	   those	   two	   properties.	   For	   	    F ∈F 2 	  binariness	   and	   a	   suitable	   normalization	   yield	   the	   desired	   result.	   Take	   now	   the	   case	   of	  
 F ∈F 2, 	  	  	   g > 2 ,	  and	  consider	  the	  problem	  	   F (i ) ∈F 2 	  .	  By	  binariness,	  
ϕi (F (i ) )




[2] 	  By	  independence,	  and	  bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  definition	  of	  opportunity	  advantage,	  	  
ϕi (F)
ϕi (F (i ) )
= Ai (F,ϕ )Ai (F (i ),ϕ )
⇒ϕi (F) =ϕi (F (i ) ) j≠i
∑ pijϕ j (F)
j≠i∑ pji( )ϕ− i (F (i ) ) 	  Substituting	  according	  to	  equation	  [2]	  yields:	  
ϕi (F) =ϕ− i (F (i ) ) j≠i
∑ pij
j≠i∑ pji
j≠i∑ pijϕ j (F)
j≠i∑ pji( )ϕ− i (F (i ) ) =
j≠i∑ pijϕ j (F)
j≠i∑ pji
	  So,	   a	   mapping	   that	   satisfies	   binariness	   and	   independence	  must	   have	   this	   format.	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Theorem	  1	   shows	   that	   this	  mapping	   is	  well	   defined,	   that	   is,	   for	   each	   problem	   there	   is	   a	  vector	   v∗ 	  with	  this	  property.	  Therefore,	  we	  conclude	  that	  there	  exist	  a	  unique	  mapping	  ω 	  that	  satisfies	  those	  properties	  and	  that	  is	  such	  that,	  for	  all	  	   i = 1,2,...,g, 	  	  
ω i (F) = j≠i
∑ pijω j (F)
j≠i∑ pji
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Q.e.d.	  	  	  
4	  	  	  Discussion	  	   We	   have	   presented	   a	   criterion	   to	   evaluate	   densities	   (continuous	   or	   discrete	  distributions)	   that	   is	   cardinal,	   transitive	   and	   complete,	   called	   the	   worth.	   It	   provides	   a	  quantitative	   assessment	   on	   the	   relative	   desirability	   of	   each	   distribution	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  likelihood	   of	   getting	   better	   results.	   The	   key	   value	   judgement	   is	   that	   of	   the	   domination	  probabilities	   in	   binary	   comparisons	   (the	   probability	   that	   a	   random	   extraction	   from	  population	  A	  yields	  a	  better	  outcome	  than	  one	  from	  population	  B,	  vis	  a	  vis	   the	  opposite).	  The	  worth	  corresponds	  of	  a	  consistent	  application	  of	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  principle	  and	  turns	  out	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  (first	  order)	  stochastic	  dominance	  criterion,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  if	  distribution	  A	   stochastically	   dominates	  distribution	  B,	   then	   the	  worth	  of	  A	   is	   larger	   than	  that	   of	  B.	   The	  worth,	   though,	   yields	   a	   complete	   ranking	   of	   the	   distributions	   and	   extends	  stochastic	  dominance	  through	  a	  venue	  that	  departs	  from	  that	  of	  higher	  order	  dominance.	  We	  have	   also	   presented	   a	   characterization	   of	   this	   evaluation	   criterion	   that	   shows	  that	  the	  worth	  is	  a	  transitive	  extension	  of	  the	  evaluation	  based	  on	  domination	  probabilities,	  which	  derives	  from	  ensuring	  that	  merging	  the	  groups	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  evaluation	  and	  the	  opportunity	  advantage	  of	  each	  distribution.	  There	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  this	  evaluation	  criterion	  that	  deserves	  some	  consideration	  as	  it	  affects	   the	   extent	   of	   its	   applicability.	   It	   refers	   to	   the	   limited	   amount	   of	   information	  required:	   the	  matrix	  of	  domination	  probabilities.	  This	   is	   the	  reason	  why	  we	  can	  evaluate	  situations	  involving	  categorical	  data,	  as	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  population	  into	   the	  different	   categories	   is	  all	  we	  need	   to	  calculate	   the	  domination	  probabilities.	  And	  also	   the	  motive	   for	   a	  warning	  when	   dealing	  with	   numerical	   variables,	   either	   discrete	   of	  continuous:	   they	   are	   to	   be	   interpreted	   as	   indexing	   attributes	   rather	   than	   as	   genuinely	  quantitative	   values.	   In	   particular,	   one	   has	   to	   bear	   in	  mind,	  when	  dealing	  with	   numerical	  variables,	   that	   this	   evaluation	   procedure	   does	   not	   compute	   the	   differences	   in	   the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  prizes,	  but	  just	  their	  ranking.	  That	  is,	  if	  we	  change	  the	  reference	  problem	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by	  taking	  the	  log	  of	  the	  prizes	  (or	  any	  monotone	  transformation)	  for	  all	  distributions,	  the	  worth	   vector	   will	   not	   change.	   Consequently,	   when	   the	   size	   of	   the	   prize	   differences	  constitutes	  a	  relevant	  part	  of	  the	  evaluation	  problem,	  a	  different	  criterion	  may	  be	  needed	  (e.g.	  a	  criterion	  computing	  the	  mean	  and	  variance	  of	  the	  distributions).	  The	  evaluation	  of	  monetary	  lotteries	  may	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point.	  A	  monetary	  lottery	  can	  be	  identified	  with	  a	  probability	  distribution	  on	  a	  set	  of	  monetary	  outcomes.	  The	  standard	  model	  of	  choice	  is	  that	  in	  which	  the	  evaluation	  U	  of	  a	  lottery	  L	   is	  identified	  with	  the	  expectation	  of	  its	  outcomes.	  That	  is,	  assuming	  a	  discrete	  number	  of	  possible	  outcomes,	  	  
x1, x2, ..., xg ,	  
U(L) = i=1
g∑ π iu(xi ) 	  where	   	   π i 	   	   is	   the	   probability	   of	   outcome	   i	   	   and	   	   u(xi ) 	   	   the	   evaluation	   of	   this	   particular	  outcome.	  Notice	  that	  comparing	  consistently	  alternative	  lotteries	  by	  this	  criterion	  requires	  this	  mapping	  to	  be	  linear	  (i.e.	  we	  can	  change	  the	  origin	  and	  units	  of	  the	  elements	  but	  not	  applying	   more	   general	   transformations).	   Consider	   again	   the	   example	   in	   Table	   1	   and	  suppose	   that	  money	  prizes	  are	  4,	  3,	  2	   and	  1,	   corresponding	   to	   categories	   I,	   II,	   III	   and	   IV,	  respectively.	  For	  any	  concave	  function	  u,	  we	  find	  that	  A	  is	  better	  than	  B	  	  (concavity	  implies	  that	  for	  distributions	  with	  the	  same	  mean	  we	  rank	  first	  those	  with	  a	  smaller	  variance).	  As	  the	   size	   of	   the	   prizes	   enters	   the	   evaluation,	   the	   ranking	   may	   differ	   (and	   in	   this	   case	   it	  actually	  does)	  from	  the	  one	  yielded	  by	  the	  worth.	  This	   in	   turn	  suggests	  an	   immediate	  application	  of	   the	  worth:	  evaluating	  monetary	  lotteries	   when	   utilities	   are	   ordinal.	   Suppose	   now	   we	   have	   a	   consumer	   with	   ordinal	  preferences	  who	  has	  to	  choose	  between	  several	  monetary	  lotteries.	  We	  can	  think	  of	  money	  prizes	  as	  representations	  of	  utilities,	  so	  that	  any	  monotone	  transformation	  of	  those	  prizes	  corresponds	  to	  an	  alternative	  representation	  of	   the	  consumer's	  utility.	   In	  this	  context	  the	  worth	  principle	  permits	  the	  consumer	  to	  evaluate	  the	  lotteries	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  domination	  probabilities	  of	   the	  underlying	  variable	   (utility).	  The	   consumer	   ranks	   first	   the	   lottery	   for	  which	  the	  probability	  of	  achieving	  a	  higher	  utility	  is	  larger.	  Note	   that	  when	   there	   is	   a	   single	   good	   (money)	   all	   increasing	   utility	   functions	   are	  ordinally	   equivalent.	   So,	   in	   this	   context,	   the	   worth	   criterion	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	  evaluation	  of	  lotteries	  of	  any	  individual	  endowed	  with	  ordinal	  monotonic	  preferences.	  The	  interpretation	  of	   the	  worth	   as	   the	  willingness	   to	  pay	   for	   a	   lottery	  makes	  here	   full	   sense.	  Also	  observe	  that	  the	  case	  of	  ordinal	  utilities	  can	  be	  also	   interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	   lotteries	  with	   prizes	   of	   unknown	  magnitude	   (i.e.	   we	   only	   know	   that	   each	   state	   of	   the	   world	   has	  associated	  a	  payment	  which	  may	  be	  larger	  or	  smaller	  than	  that	  of	  another	  one,	  but	  do	  not	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know	  the	  size	  of	  the	  differences).	  When	  we	  deal	  with	  numerical	  variables	  the	  categories	  are	  usually	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  intervals	  over	  the	  range	  of	  the	  variable	  under	  consideration.	  The	  way	  of	  defining	  those	  intervals	  affects	  the	  evaluation	  outcomes	  because	  all	  observations	  that	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  cell	  are	   indistinguishable,	  as	  we	  only	   take	   into	  account	   the	  distribution	  of	   the	  population	  within	  the	  intervals.	  In	  some	  cases	  there	  is	  a	  natural	  way	  of	  defining	  those	  intervals,	  as	  the	  categories	   are	   simply	   parameterized	   by	   the	   values	   of	   the	   variable.	   This	   is	   the	   case,	   for	  instance,	  with	  the	  levels	  of	  competence	  that	  appear	  in	  the	  PISA	  studies.	  The	  OECD	  defines	  six	  levels	  of	  competence,	  based	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  deal	  with	  different	  degrees	  of	  complexity,	  which	  are	  parameterized	  in	  terms	  of	  values	  of	  the	  test	  scores	  (see	  Herrero,	  Méndez	  &	  Villar	  (2014)	   for	   an	   application	   to	   this	   scenario).	   In	   other	   cases,	   however,	   the	   construction	   of	  those	  intervals	  may	  become	  rather	  arbitrary	  and	  hence	  the	  evaluation	  lack	  of	  robustness.	  In	   that	   context	   the	   recourse	   to	   identifying	   each	   point	   of	   the	   support	  with	   a	   category	   or	  using	  continuous	  distributions	  may	  help,	  as	   it	  avoids	  the	  need	  of	  building	  those	  intervals.	  One	  may	  use	  standard	  procedures	  to	  estimate	  the	  density	  (e.g.	  kernel	  estimation	  with	  an	  optimization	  algorithm	  to	  determine	  de	  proper	  bandwidth),	  and	  then	  make	  the	  evaluation	  using	   the	   continuous	   version	   of	   the	   formula	   to	   calculate	   the	   domination	   probabilities,	  without	  introducing	  unjustified	  parameters.	  Let	  us	  conclude	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  there	  are	  different	  instances	  in	  which	  we	  find	  continuous	  or	  discrete	  ordinal	  variables,	  besides	  the	  case	  of	  ordinal	  utilities.	  An	  example	  is	  that	   of	   visual	   numerical	   scales	   that	   are	   used	   in	   medical	   treatments	   in	   order	   to	   assess	  aspects	   such	   as	   pain	   intensity	   (Hawker	   et	   al	   (2011)).	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   but	   in	   a	   rather	  different	   context,	   we	   find	   the	   assignment	   of	   points	   to	   levels	   of	   a	   scale	   in	   some	   of	   the	  variables	  that	  appear	  in	  the	  recent	  EurLife	  study	  (an	  interactive	  database	  on	  quality	  of	  life	  in	   Europe,	   offering	   data	   drawn	   from	   the	   Foundation's	   own	   surveys	   and	   from	   other	  published	   sources).	   For	   instance,	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   national	   public	   education	   system	   is	  evaluated	  by	  given	  a	  ten	  level	  scoring	  rule	  that	  assigns	  1	  point	  to	  'Very	  poor	  quality'	  and	  10	  points	  to	   'Very	  high	  quality'.	  Note	  that	   in	  these	  cases	  the	  evaluation	  in	  terms	  of	  means	  or	  more	  complex	  functions	  of	  those	  variables	  are	  fully	  dependent	  on	  the	  scoring	  rule,	  which	  may	  be	  rather	  arbitrary.	  The	  worth	  does	  not	  need	  of	  those	  scores	  to	  get	  the	  evaluation.	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